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Introduction
In 2011, while studying the relation between large-scale and small-scale gold
mining in the western region of Ghana, we were invited to visit a concession
where the Canadian mining company Keegan Resources was about to move
from the stage of exploration to industrial mining. The CEO of the company,
a geologist, was excited about the discovery that appeared to allow for this
development: for a long time alluvial gold had been mined near the riverbed,
but in 2006 Keegan found the source of this alluvial gold while constructing a
road. This accidental ﬁnd was followed by extensive exploration activities,
which allowed Keegan to identify the exact location and contours of the ore
body. During the visit, the geologist wanted to show us the hill that contained
the ore body in its outcrop. On our walk uphill, several artisanal miners, both
men andwomen, approached us, shouting and screaming while making angry ges-
tures. They prevented us from accessing the area, clearly indicating that this hill
belonged to them and underscoring that the company and artisanal miners were
in competition over this particular deposit. After we explained our purpose and
position, we were made to understand that we should go and see the chief of
the village ﬁrst, to ask permission to enter their mining area. Clearly, status posi-
tions and legitimation of claims were contested in this competition over mineral
resources: the company may ofﬁcially own the concession and mineral rights,
but local artisanal miners consider their appropriation of this resource legitimate
and see their chief as the appropriate authority.
However, the tensions over appropriation were not solely affected by challenges
in the social arena as to who has authority to give or withhold access to resources.
The geologist explained that the staff’s excitement at ﬁnding the source of the
alluvial gold in this outcrop had its downside: the geological situation is such
that the ore can be targeted both by artisanal miners using artisanal methods
and by large-scale industrial miners. Artisanal miners can easily access the ore
by building horizontal tunnels at several points into the hill, as well as easily
process the ore as weathering has made the material soft. According to the
CEO of Keegan Resources, since this discovery, around 1,000 artisanal miners
have left their alluvial sites near the riverbed to start digging uphill, and he stressed
that gaining exclusive access to this primary source would be very difﬁcult.
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Two factors appear to play a key role in the challenges and competition over
access to this ore body. First of all, given the history of artisanal mining and
the way gold mining has been embedded in local practices of land use and struc-
tures of authority, Keegan Resources will never be in a position to fully exclude
artisanal miners from ‘their’ concession. Working out some sort of arrangement
in which artisanal miners’ access will be conﬁned will require the support of the
local chiefs. Secondly, geology plays an important role in the way in which differ-
ent groups may or may not have access to the resources: the way this particular ore
body is located underground allows for extraction on different scales. Industrial
and artisanal miners differ in their technical capabilities to access (parts of)
speciﬁc ore bodies. Both socio-political aspects and geological features of ore
bodies inﬂuence how companies and artisanal miners work out arrangements con-
cerning access to and control of gold deposits at speciﬁc localities. The aim of this
article is to foreground and analyse the interplay between politics and geology in
forms of cohabitation between miners operating at different scales. We call this
interplay in-depth geopolitics.
Cohabitation: negotiating access and control
The situation described above is typical of many places where gold mining occurs in
Ghana, and in Africa more broadly. In most of the areas in which the national state
has allocated permits to international companies – both junior exploration com-
panies and major companies with productive gold mines – large-scale mining is
taking place alongside other forms of land use, in particular gold mining at an arti-
sanal scale. Mining companies are often relative newcomers on the scene, whereas
artisanal gold mining and other forms of land use such as agriculture have a much
longer history. Scholars (Hilson 2002a; Aubynn 2006; 2009) describe how mines
can opt to forge partnerships with local small-scale miners, for example by allocat-
ing speciﬁc areas to artisanal miners, while declaring target areas for the company’s
industrial operations off limits for small-scale miners. Several gold mining compan-
ies describe their policies for dealing with such situations in terms of ‘cohabitation’
(see, for example, AGA 2010: 31). The cohabitation that is brought about shows
interesting spatial intertwining around access points to mineral deposits, or ‘ore
bodies’. A major question concerns the power relations through which these
arrangements have to be worked out. Jennings (1994) argues that, since mining
companies are the legal and authorized owners, cohabitation is merely based on
a voluntary agreement. Mining companies can choose to accept small mining
operations on their concession and specify the conditions under which these can
continue. Jennings is right that in terms of national law, large-scale miners have
legal status while artisanal miners – in Ghana called galamsey – often lack such
status. This legal/illegal divide is highly relevant for governance issues and can
lead to uneven power relations in forms of cohabitation or to the dispossession
of small-scale miners altogether (Hilson and Yakovleva 2007; Tschakert 2009).
Power conﬁgurations at mining sites may be more complex, however, as Emel
et al. show (2011). They point out that in most African countries the state’s author-
ity to grant mining rights is based on a system in which the state is the ultimate
owner of subsoil mineral wealth: the distinction between public and private
coincides with the difference between subsurface and surface ownership.
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Furthermore, national sovereignty over mineral wealth – so-called subterranean
sovereignty – has often been framed in opposition to foreign capital. The authors
show, however, how the national ownership of subterranean resources may
facilitate alliances between state and international companies at the expense
of local groups’ surface rights at mining sites, often limiting their access. Yet,
they suggest, the way in which ‘subterranean sovereignty’ and ‘layered rights’
affect power relations between state authorities, companies and local communities
must be studied empirically since ‘sovereignty is negotiated at the level of the
global-national scale, [but] it is territorialized at the local scale. Thus, we must
also keep attuned to the ways in which local populations living in the spaces of
extraction are constantly interrupting state-capital sovereignty projects’ (Emel
et al. 2011: 73).
In order to move away from a limited perspective on rights, Ribot and
Peluso (2003) have suggested focusing on access rather than on (formal) property
and entitlements. They deﬁne access as the ability to beneﬁt from things.
Sometimes one may have rights, but the means to beneﬁt from these rights
(such as capital or labour) are lacking. In that case one has property (the right
to beneﬁt) without access (the ability to beneﬁt). In their theoretical frame they
elaborate how technology, capital, markets, labour, knowledge, authority, iden-
tities and social relations more broadly inﬂuence access mechanisms; hence
they talk about a ‘web of access’. Moreover, they distinguish between ‘access
control’ and ‘access maintenance’: the ﬁrst concerns the ability to mediate the
access of others; the second is about how one can safeguard access over some-
thing from which one takes beneﬁts.
Since the publication of this work, different scholars have brought some of these
insights to the study of allocation of land and resource exploitation in African
societies. Sikor and Lund (2009) have shown how access mechanisms are affected
by the exercise of power and authority. Current approaches underscore that, in
Africa, access to land can only be understood in wider arenas of authorizers
such as chiefs, ritual ofﬁciants, landowners and state authorities. As Lentz
(2006: 1) argues for West Africa in general, land ownership is a complex bundle
of socially and politically embedded rights related to speciﬁc groups of which
membership can be contested and negotiated. Not surprisingly, mining companies
seeking access to land become part and parcel of these local arenas in which access
and authority are negotiated.
Local political dimensions affecting mining practices in Ghana have only
recently started to be addressed, although conﬂicts between large-scale and arti-
sanal mining have been studied for a longer period (Hilson 2002b; Andrew
2003; Hilson et al. 2007; Aubynn 2009). Standing and Hilson (2013) explore
how chiefs beneﬁt directly from formal arrangements for the redistribution of
mineral wealth, and Geenen (2015) analyses mining concessions as sites of
hybrid governance. Our article connects with this literature and shows how
access to gold resources is entangled with the socio-political landscape at tangible
mining sites. It does so, however, by adding an extra dimension to the political
landscape of mining. So far, studies on mining in Africa have taken a two-dimen-
sional, horizontal, perspective. The studies often focus on land use and analyse
how large-scale and small-scale miners compete over the same surface area
(Hilson 2002a; 2002b). However, they do not fully acknowledge that geological
characteristics are key to how access to gold is organized. The spatial approach
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proposed here explicitly moves from a ﬂat to a three-dimensional perspective: dif-
ferent miners work different parts of deposits located at different depths. We will
show how 3D perspectives – that is, the knowledge of speciﬁc subterranean
structures – play a major role in shaping interactions over access between
miners. The embeddedness of 3D perspectives in the landscape of socio-political
relations – in-depth geopolitics – is central to this article.
In-depth geopolitics: from surface to underground
Concessions for mineral or oil extraction have been portrayed mainly as contigu-
ous spaces, Bridge (2009) argues, whereas in practice they are marked primarily
by an agglomeration of access points and can be characterized as ‘punctuated,
discontinuous geographies of extraction [that] do not coincide well with
notions of national territory’ (ibid.: 46). Bridge builds on James Ferguson’s cri-
tique (2005) of James Scott’s (1998) focus on the nation state as territorial grid
maker, in which he argues that in contemporary Africa mining companies are
important organizers of space. Companies – oil companies serve as Ferguson’s
examples – carve out usable spaces to which their capital can ‘hop’, bypassing
unusable spaces. He argues that the way in which companies secure spaces for
mining – creating mining enclaves, for example – undermines the contiguous and
bounded nature of national territories. Building upon this idea, Hannah Appel
(2012: 439) shows what the ‘hopping’ of capital looks like at an oil site in
Equatorial Guinea, describing ‘how infrastructure becomes a key site through
which oil and gas companies and Equatoguinean actors negotiate entanglement
and disentanglement, responsibility and its abdication’. Both Ferguson (2005)
and Appel (2012) show how the spatial organization of extraction is relevant to
issues of sovereignty and governance, but they conﬁne their view to the surface
level. Bridge (2009) emphasizes the subsurface dimension of how capital ‘hops’
and ‘lands’ by paying attention to the ways in which operations tap into ‘a nether-
world of rocks and reservoirs’. The knowledge and techniques used to get access to
undergroundwealth structure relations on the ground: they determine how sites are
securitized, which patches are considered valuable, and which are dismissed as
unusable.
The characteristics of access control and maintenance at speciﬁc mining conces-
sions are strongly inﬂuenced by an interplay between three factors: (1) the stage of
a mining operation (in particular the exploration and gold-producing mode);
(2) the historical embeddedness of artisanal gold mining in local socio-political
landscapes; and (3) the characteristics of the speciﬁc subterranean structures. It
is this interplay that we term ‘in-depth geopolitics’. Our approach builds on
recent insights in the disciplines of geography and anthropology, which inform
our rethinking of ‘geopolitics’. Currently, those who use this term insist that atten-
tion should be given to conﬂicts playing out at different (spatial) scales and to
power holders other than states (such as economic actors, including mining com-
panies) (Cowen and Smith 2009). What we do in this article concurs with this
alternative approach to geopolitics: we take mining concessions as sites for govern-
ance involving economic players (mining companies and artisanal miners) and
political authorities positioned at national as well as local scales. But where we
move beyond this approach is in the ‘in-depth’, 3D, aspect of our approach to
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geopolitics, which ties in with the current attention to materiality in anthropology.
Following the pioneering work of Tsing (2005), Ferry (2005) and Ferry and
Limbert (2008), Richardson and Weszkalnys (2014) demonstrate how social
studies should pay attention to the characteristics of mineral matters and infra-
structures of extraction. Such a focus on the entanglement of the material with
the social has proved to be very valuable for the study of mining practices.
Subterranean territory that is targeted for mineral extraction can be seen as ‘socio-
natures’ (Swyngedouw 1996; 2004; Gellert 2005): as ore bodies embedded in
speciﬁc social and technical frames of possibilities and circumstances. Our study
of ‘in-depth geopolitics’ builds on these scholarly developments. The article
shows how ways of governing access to gold on mining concessions are informed
by an intricate combination of social and natural factors: a socio-political ﬁeld of
relations anchored onto an underground of geological structures. In order to
analyse these forms of governance, we look at two mining operations located in
south-western Ghana: one at the exploratory stage and the other a large-scale pro-
ducing mine. Before turning to our cases, however, we brieﬂy reﬂect on our digging
into geology.
Anthropological digging into geological perspectives
Anthropologists are aware of the problems of doing research in ﬁelds where they
may lack knowledge of matters that require technical expertise. Whether such
research concerns the anthropology of engineers (Latour 1987), ﬁnancial
experts (Ho 2009; Maurer 2005; Zaloom 2006) or geologists, it can raise access
problems of different sorts. In order to develop an analytical eye for geological
expertise, we carried out collective ﬁeldwork in Ghana and visited the two conces-
sions in the company of Henk Gewald, a retired geologist who previously worked
for the mining company Anglo American. He was invaluable not only as an expert
with whom we could discuss geology, but also as a co-interviewer. At Newmont,
for example, Henk Gewald’s presence made it possible to discuss geological
speciﬁcs of the concession with company geologists. While looking at cross-
sections of underground ore bodies on computer screens, we gained key insights
into the company’s uses of geological knowledge in working out social arrange-
ments of cohabitation with artisanal miners. The presence of an expert in
geology in our research team allowed us to see how knowledge about the under-
ground is a major factor in organizing access control and maintenance (Ribot and
Peluso 2003). In order to appreciate how this knowledge was instrumental in
working out arrangements of cohabitation, we brieﬂy recapitulate basic distinc-
tions used by geologists.
Drawing the location of gold in a cross-section, Henk Gewald illustrated how
geologists portray the underground world of ore bodies as disembedded from
social circumstances on the surface (Figure 1). In reports accessible to the
public, however, socio-technical information relevant to extraction is abridged
using the terms ‘reserves’ and ‘resources’.
Geological ‘deep time’ consists of slow processes in which small amounts of
gases and liquids separate and travel to more accommodating places (Gewald
2010). The pathways for these ‘migrants’ are the cracks (veins and fractures) in
the system. Quartz, some iron minerals and, occasionally, gold may travel along
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with such ﬂuids. If stopped, this forms a ‘deposit’, which is called ‘ore deposit’ if it
has sufﬁcient economic value. Some parts of the ore are more easily extracted than
others as a result of weathering, a process in which rocks, soils and minerals break
FIGURE 1 Cross-section depicting location of gold (Au).1
1We have chosen to use the original drawings done by Henk Gewald in the article.
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down through contact with air and water. This may happen in situ (by oxidation),
but it also results from erosion where soil has been transported by water. Figure 1
shows an upper layer (‘alluvial and residual’) of subsurface material that has been
moved, then a layer of rocks that have been weathered by oxidation (‘saprolites’),
and a bottom layer of ‘fresh rock’.2
In order to assess extractability, mining companies need to calculate whether
and how ore deposits can be mined in a feasible way. Whereas a ‘resource’ and a
‘reserve’ are both considered potentially valuable deposits, a ‘reserve’ has the
added characteristics of being legally, economically and technically feasible to
extract. The distinction is used to guide decisions: is the mineral wealth
located in a particular deposit valuable enough to invest in infrastructure? Do
the social and political circumstances allow access to the ore? Parts of the
deposit for which the answer is ‘yes’ are labelled as ‘reserve’; other parts are
classiﬁed as ‘resource’. Since these social-technical circumstances may change
over time, mining companies cannot base their decisions solely on theoretically
informed 3D visualizations of space. Changes in the world market price of a
speciﬁc mineral and/or political circumstances can turn resources into reserves
and vice versa. As one of Keegan’s exploration geologists told us: ‘With gold at
US$2,000 an ounce,3 the whole of Ghana is going to be turned over; at $250 all
projects go into mothballs.’ Moreover, social circumstances and political
factors play a major role in reclassifying ‘ore’ as either reserve or resource,
and occasionally even stop projects completely (Welker 2014: 53; Sosa 2012:
204–5). The notions ‘reserve’ and ‘resource’ serve to classify ore bodies as socio-
natures, a combination of social and natural factors. They force mining com-
panies to assess the speciﬁc circumstances of the locality in which they would
like to extract the ore.
In Ghana, the underground wealth is situated in social ﬁelds marked by a long
history of artisanal mining and a speciﬁc political arena. While both companies
in our study are legally the concession owners, in certain local settings the legal
status attributed by the state is not the all-determining factor. In order to get at
the ore, companies need to insert themselves into the already existing local
social ﬁeld: they need to engage in a politics of cohabitation by ﬁnding out how
their own goals and capabilities for exploring and/or mining can be matched to
the speciﬁcs of the local mining situation and political arena. For the two case
studies, our analysis of in-depth geopolitics shows how 3D knowledge about
ore bodies can be instrumental for formulating governance strategies, in which
knowledge of the 2D social ﬁeld is mergedwith a 3D perspective on ore. This com-
bined knowledge serves not only to identify where competition over ore is to be
expected, or which parts of ore bodies can be accessed only by industrial
mining technology, but also what kind of cohabitation between large-scale and
small-scale miners may be possible.
2Alluvial gold is ‘free gold’; it is relatively easy to access because it is not contained in rocks,
while gold that is ‘locked up’ needs to be liberated by crushing the gold material, and thus requires
more technically advanced approaches.
31 ounce = approximately 28.35 grams.
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Keegan Resources: competing over an outcrop?
At the time of ﬁeld research in January 2011, the Canadian ‘junior’ Keegan
Resources4 was developing an exploration concession in a rural area south-west
of Kumasi. Keegan originated as a project of a group of friends from
Vancouver, where they employed about ten staff. In Ghana, they employed
ﬁfteen to twenty expat staff and 150 to 200 Ghanaian employees, of which a
good number came from communities surrounding their concession. Keegan’s
operation was considered to be fragile in terms of both its ﬁnancial security on
the market and the social setting in which it had to operate.
Keegan, as an exploration company, was small in size and had limited physical
visibility; it employed a small number of staff and its camp at the project site con-
sisted of only a few houses for lodging, a small canteen, some ofﬁces and a space to
store and analyse core samples. Unlike big mining companies, facilities at the com-
pound were limited and in the evenings staff members occasionally went to the
neighbouring village to get a cold drink. The operations of the company in the con-
cession area appeared small, due to the speciﬁc technical stage of exploration. A few
drills were on-site, trying to map out the ore body, and there was a zone for metal-
lurgical test work. A security system had been put in place but was rather limited:
the compoundwas barely fenced and the concession not surveyed by a private secur-
ity force. For its geopolitics, Keegan relied ﬁrst of all on the police, and thus on the
Ghanaian state. In a relatively remote area, with little state presence, this created a
challenging situation where securing the company’s rights as concession owner
involved long and ongoing negotiations with the local village chief. The geopolitics
in the 2D social ﬁeld made the company dependent upon an assemblage of actors,
some associated with the state, others with local authority structures.
The fragility of the operation, in terms of its scale, went hand in handwith a tense
social situation that Keegan ‘inherited’ from its predecessor, the Canadian gold
producer Bonte Gold Mines. Bonte, which had mined the alluvial deposits in the
riverbeds of the concession from 1994 to 2004, was liquidated on 31 March 2004,
following the results of cases ﬁled against the company by shareholders and cred-
itors. It left without rehabilitating the environment and failed to pay wages to
workers or compensation to farmers (Campbell 2011).5 According to Keegan’s
employees and management, the strained situation created by Bonte affected the
way in which Keegan Resources was able to start its operations. Bonte’s legacy
shows that not only do actions of mining companies at the early stages of their
own operation affect long-term relations with surrounding artisanal miners
(Teschner 2013), but the actions of predecessors also have a signiﬁcant impact on
the wider contemporary social arena in which mining companies must operate.
Keegan’s social setting was also strongly shaped by the current presence of
artisanal miners in the concession area. Scholars have shown that companies and
artisanal miners draw upon each other’s knowledge to explore gold deposits.
4In February 2013, Keegan Resources renamed the company as Asanko Gold, a change that
underscores the centrality of Ghana for the company’s operation and also marks its transform-
ation from an advanced stage exploration and development company to a signiﬁcant gold produ-
cer. See <http://www.asanko.com>.
5See also articles and press releases at <http://www.infomine.com>, <https://www.modernghana.
com>, <https://www.ghanaweb.com>, and the National Coalition on Mining Ghana.
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Dumett (1998), for example, shows that the Wassa Gold Company, which operated
in Ghana in the late 1800s, had few means to ﬁnd gold other than searching for
abandoned artisanal sites. Nowadays, too, foreign companies often need the knowl-
edge of artisanal miners to lead them to productive sites (Luning 2014). At the same
time, artisanal miners closely observe the methods of new companies (sometimes as
employees) and, where possible, use these in their own operations (Luning et al.
2014). Similar processes took place in Keegan’s concession, where company–
artisan interactions could almost be characterized as forms of espionage. The
CEO of Keegan explained to us that artisanal miners sometimes read companies’
websites to explore places to mine. But the company itself also follows the artisanal
miners; as the CEO stated: ‘When we see where they are digging, we go drilling.
When they see us drilling, they go digging.’ In order to understand how skirmishes
over forms of cohabitation between Keegan and artisanal miners were shaped by
both the legacy of a previous gold-mining company and the history of artisanal
mining in the concession, we need to apply a 3D geological perspective.
Keegan’s main target, the source of the alluvial gold that Bonte and artisanal
miners mined previously, appeared to be almost vertically located in a hill with
a clear exit point to the surface (Figure 2), called the outcrop. As we describe in
the introduction, in this geological situation both artisanal miners (galamsey)
using artisanal methods and companies using industrial means can target the
ore. The fact that this ore body is suitable for different scales of mining gave
rise to an edgy situation in which multiple stakeholders (Keegan Resources,
local communities and ‘external’ galamsey) expressed an interest and tried to
claim and control access to the deposit. The in-depth geopolitics was strongly
inﬂuenced by this potential competition over the ore, which made arrangements
for cohabitation precarious and full of tension.
The incident described in the introduction shows the public contestation of the
company’s access to this part of the concession. The challenges were not limited to
competition over resources, but also concerned recognition of status positions and
legitimation of claims: the company may ofﬁcially own the concession and
mineral rights, but local artisanal miners consider their appropriation of this
resource legitimate and see their chief as the appropriate authority.
Being embedded in this social arena, Keegan Resources was not in a position to
exclude artisanal miners from its concession. On the contrary, its only hope was to
workout some form of compromise in which it would try to regulate and conﬁne arti-
sanal miners’ access to the concession. Its aim was to maintain sole access to the
primary resource, but in exchange it accepted – on certain conditions – that artisanal
minerswould continue to mine the alluvial deposits in the riverbed, a strategy that, as
noted earlier, is not uncommon (Hilson 2002a: 72). Miners originating from commu-
nities in the vicinity who were using artisanal methods were tolerated, but outsiders
coming with machines were not. In order to work out such arrangements, staff of the
company acknowledged their dependence on the local chiefs. In the company’s ofﬁce
wewere shownmaps in which boundaries of stool lands of chiefs6 were superimposed
upon geological information concerning the area. Collaboration with the chiefs was
6In the south of Ghana, the stool is the symbolic object associated with chieftaincy. In colonial
times, chiefdoms became organized as territorial units. Ever since, stool lands have been formally
recognized by the state and are governed by chiefs (Firmin-Sellers 1995).
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made more problematic because some of them were pushing to re-mine Bonte’s
former areawith excavators, sowewere told. Even thoughKeegan was not interested
in mining this area itself, it wanted to prevent ‘foreigners’with machines from getting
access to the riverbed, since doing so would open the door to the whole of the
Ghanaian galamsey world: ‘We just want traditional ways of mining and local
people,’ they argued. At the time of our research, we could not conﬁrm whether
the chiefs were indeed persuaded to collaborate with the company on these terms,
but the case shows their key position in negotiating cohabitation.
The example clearly illustrates the merits of attending to in-depth geopolitics.
For governing access to gold, the company depended on the chiefs as a conse-
quence of the 3D geology, an ore deposit that created direct competition over
access, and the 2D social ﬁeld in the area. Being a small exploration company,
with limited possibilities to enforce its mineral rights, the company sought to nego-
tiate ways of ‘conﬁned’ cohabitation, limiting: (1) which area could be accessed; (2)
which groups could get access; and (3) which techniqueswould be allowed. In order
to realize these limitations, the company ‘played the card’ of tradition and auto-
chthony (Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005; Geschiere 2009). In other words, it was
willing to allow a key role for the chiefs and the local population, who claimed
access based on property rights and autochthony, at the expense of ‘foreign’ galam-
sey (from elsewhere in Ghana), who would be more difﬁcult to control and could
access the ore in the hill on a larger scale with their excavators.
FIGURE 2 Keegan’s geological situation.
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Newmont: sharing a golden table?
Newmont Mining Company is a large-scale gold-producing company with opera-
tions in the US, South America, Africa, Indonesia and Australia (Newmont
2009). Newmont’s mine in Ghana is located in the rural area of the Brong
Ahafo region in Western Ghana, not far from the urban centre of Sunyani. At
the start of mining operations in 2006, the Ahafo mine processed ore from
seven major pits, extending along a 40 kilometre strike (Hilson 2011: 10935),
with substantial infrastructure, such as large mining equipment and roads. Here
we ﬁnd the typical spatial arrangement for a large-scale producing mine: an area
with ofﬁces, restaurants, the processing plant and the central open pit, which are
secluded and heavily securitized by a private security service. This part of the con-
cession resembles the enclaved mining zones described by Ferguson (2005), Appel
(2012) and MacEachern (2010). Even though this secluded area is only a small
part of the concession as a whole, it dominates the local landscape. An extensive
corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmewith a large variety of community
activities (Newmont 2005; 2009) adds to the company’s visibility. The size of the
operation and its visibility, typical for the production stage, affected the claims
and expectations entailed in company–community relations.
Several studies describe how the Ahafo mine came into the hands of Newmont
as part of the takeover of Normandy, an Australian gold-mining company, in 2002
(Hilson 2011; Welker 2014). Normandy had done no more than explore the
area; no efforts had been made to build a mine, nor had there been any attempts
to set up a CSR programme. When Newmont started its mining operations in
2006, the company initiated a CSR programme from scratch: in contrast to the
case of Keegan, the company was not burdened by older legacies of tensions
and promises. The Ahafo mine was seen by Newmont’s CSR staff as a ﬂagship
case where CSR could be tailored exactly as it should be (Welker 2014: 35)7
and where Newmont would be a ‘good company’, working hard to gain its
licence to operate (ibid.: 54–5). This was all the more urgent at the Ahafo mine,
given the social ﬁeld in which chiefs were dominant. Kapelus (2009: 100) describes
the company’s dependence on traditional power holders at the expense of local
government ofﬁcials, and Hilson (2007: 51) details the pitfalls associated with
representation of ‘the local community’.
As in the case of Keegan, the area where Newmont operates has a long history
of artisanal gold mining. According to Grifﬁs et al. (2002: 184), the Gold Coast
Geological Survey outlined the broad-scale geology of the area and noted old allu-
vial workings in the Kenyase area. Indeed, one of the striking features of the
present situation is the prominence of artisanal miners on Newmont’s mining con-
cession. However, artisanal mining is barely mentioned in reports on community
relationships. Although Newmont’s Community Relationships Review (2009)
acknowledges the historical presence of artisanal mining, Kapelus’s (2009)
7Hilson (2011) acknowledges that this has had positive effects, but also points out that it led
the company to formulate the CSR in an insulated manner, depending primarily on its own
best practices, ICMM (International Council on Mining and Metals) standards and consultants,
rather than on strong ties with and inputs from the community.
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in-depth narrative on Newmont`s Ahafo mine gives it no mention, indicating that
artisanal mining has never been an explicit topic for company policies.
During our ﬁeldwork, the question did arise of how Newmont negotiates the
presence of artisanal miners and their access to the deposits. Whereas staff
members in charge of public and community relations told us a lot about CSR
and company–community relations, they remained relatively silent on artisanal
mining. Our conversations with geologists, however, raised interesting perspectives
on how the company tried to work out forms of cohabitation with artisanal
miners. Newmont tolerates these artisanal miners, a strategy that is informed by
‘in-depth geopolitics’: the socio-political structures as well as the geological char-
acteristics of the underground area.
The artisanal miners, whose major operation concentrated on a site called
Sikamina, meaning ‘the pit of money’, ran relatively large operations that used dif-
ferent kinds of machines and generated substantial revenues. The geologists
showed us a 3D perspective on industrial extraction, as well as how this could
be carried out in the social ﬁeld of artisanal mining. We were presented with a
cross-section to illustrate the speciﬁc structure of the way gold is positioned under-
ground, and how – given such a 3D perspective – artisanal and industrial mining
could cohabit. Aswe will demonstrate, the in-depth geopolitics of the setting allows
for a solution in which the area of Sikamina is currently an artisanal site, even
though Newmont proposes a new open pit in that area to be mined in the future.
Whereas Keegan’s ore body was positioned vertically in a hill, in Newmont’s
Sikamina gold is positioned in multiple horizontal ‘tables’, as indicated in
Figure 3. The water level is located between the ﬁrst and the second table. This
geological speciﬁcity leads to a situation in which both artisanal miners and the
company have access to, and are partly in competition over, parts of the
deposit. How could this social ﬁeld of friction result in a scenario for feasible
cohabitation? Let us ﬁrst describe the current situation, in which only artisanal
miners are digging for ore.
During our visit to Sikamina, a committee in charge of governing this artisanal
mining site hosted us. The chairman belonged to one of the landowning families,
and other members had been chosen because of their experience and expertise as
gold miners. The committee explained that, before the area became a mining site,
the landowners had been cocoa farmers. Three years ago they began renting the
area to miners, which they expected to provide more money than Newmont’s com-
pensation for cocoa trees. Access to the gold was secured by combining property,
the landowners, with ability, the miners (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Subsequently, as
we will see later, access to the deposit also had to be negotiatedwith the concession
owner, Newmont.
After introductions, we were given permission to enter the site. The area con-
sisted of a large number of ghettos (see Figure 4): distinct spaces where ‘gangs’
run underground mining operations. Revenues are based on the amount of bags
of ore produced and are shared on a weekly basis between all people involved
in the operation. These typically include the committee, the landowner, the
plant owner (who provides electricity), the labourers, the ﬁnancier, the ghetto
owner, and contractors (who provide the jackhammer, for example).
Interestingly, the surface level of the ghetto – with a main shaft at the centre –
does not reﬂect the layout of the underground area. From the vertical shaft,
going down to around 50 metres, the operation extends into horizontal ‘drives’.
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In each drive, work teams consisting of watchmen, people with chisels, hammers
and carriers, and occasionally someone with a jackhammer, try to extend the
‘face’ (the far end) of the drive as quickly as possible. Neighbouring ghettos
may cross paths underground, and conﬂicts can arise. In such cases, the committee
is called upon to assess and resolve the issue.
Although Newmont is the ofﬁcial owner of the concession, the artisanal site
within its concession is well and independently organized: a clear governing
system with accepted authorities had been established over the years. Moreover,
miners in this area perceived it as their right to mine there; the fact that
Newmont accepted their presence was not seen as a gift, but as the conﬁrmation
of their rights. Although Newmont did not necessarily share this perception, it did
allow the artisanal miners to continue mining. The reasons for this are both geo-
logical and socio-political.
First of all, the artisanal mining operations in ‘the pit of money’ target the
ﬁrst table of gold, which is situated above the water table. As one of Newmont’s
geologists explained to us, Newmont uses the water level as the natural barrier
for artisanal mining. Although artisanal miners are able to go relatively deep
with simple methods, it would be too difﬁcult and expensive for them to pass
the natural water level. Once the artisanal miners have mined the ﬁrst table of
gold and reached the water level, they have to abandon the area. At this point,
Newmont takes over and develops their pit.
FIGURE 3 Newmont’s geological situation.
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Secondly, Newmont operates in a speciﬁc social and political landscape. The
organization of the mining site conﬁrms the importance of local authorities
(Newmont 2009; Hilson 2007; 2011) and land use structures: local authorities
and gold miners team up in governing the site. Newmont’s strategy to ‘give’
part of the ore to artisanal miners is not so much based on generosity, but born
out of necessity. Even though this company is a major transnational corporation
and has the legal title to the concession, on the ground it is facedwith a social ﬁeld
of land users and local authorities that restricts the company’s options for organ-
izing its operations. Newmont knows that, in the twenty-ﬁrst century, it cannot get
rid of artisanal mining. This is the result not just of alliances between chiefs, land-
owners and artisanal miners, but also of converging interests between the local
population and national politicians. As Newmont’s senior geologist explained:
‘The company cannot easily ask the government to remove all these people,
because they represent 10,000 votes.’ Moreover, considering the artisanal
FIGURE 4 Ghettos at Sikamina.
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miners’ determination and conviction that they have the right to mine, forbidding
artisanal mining would create serious tensions in the area and therefore might
inﬂuence Newmont’s social licence to operate.8 If it were not for the water level
serving as a natural barrier, the tensions around the mine and the competition
for its ore would be much more intense. In this case, the in-depth geopolitics
that shapes negotiations over access forces Newmont to accept cohabitation in
the present. However, this is only temporary since the geological conditions
promise the company the prospect of exclusive access in the near future.
Comparison of two cases
This article seeks to contribute to a comparative approach to extraction practices,
involving both fossil fuels and minerals, such as gold, by adopting a 3D perspec-
tive. We have analysed the in-depth geopolitics of two gold operations in terms of
three characteristics: (1) the type of large-scale mining operation; (2) the local
history of gold mining and the socio-political landscape; and (3) the geological
layout. The combination of these factors inﬂuences the ways in which access to
gold is governed and negotiated in speciﬁc politics of cohabitation.
Typically, Ghanaian gold concessions for both exploration companies (known
as ‘juniors’) and for gold-producing companies (known as ‘majors’) encompass
substantial zones marked by the presence of villages, agricultural lands and arti-
sanal mining sites. This forces companies to work out arrangements of cohabit-
ation. In existing studies of the governance of extraction, in which oil features
prominently, the enclaved nature of extractive practices is emphasized.
Ferguson discusses the concept of ‘extractive enclaving’ (2005: 378) and Bridge
(2009) argues that extraction produces classic enclave economies that are deeply
integrated into the global economy but also fragmented from national space. In
this article we have sought to explore a broader range of the spatial arrangements
characteristic of extractive practices, by looking at a ‘minor’ exploration and a
‘major’ production operation.
In the ﬁrst case, the exploration company of Keegan Resources, the notion of
‘enclave’ seems to be altogether at odds with the actual spatial arrangement.
Instead, we found that ‘intertwinement’ is a core characteristic of the spatial
arrangement. Even in the case of Newmont, the major producing company, the
notion of enclave must be nuanced. We see that the company securitizes and
closes off patches within the concession where its capital (machines, processing
plant and staff) and access points to the deposit (Bridge 2009) are located, but
other parts of the concession may be ‘left’ to artisanal miners.
The case studies show that, for gold mining, the notion of ‘enclave’ may be too
rigid, leaving the question of how different mining companies manage to govern
their concession in a speciﬁc context under-analysed. The two cases foreground
how differences in operations are part of the in-depth geopolitics that affects
modalities of ‘governing extraction’. The attention of Emel et al. (2011) to ‘sub-
terranean sovereignty’ urges researchers to analyse how local politics interrupt the
8For more references to the notion of a ‘social licence to operate’, see, for example, Bridge
(2009), Prno and Slocombe (2012) and Baba and Raufﬂet (2014).
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state–company sovereignty process. The cases we have presented speak directly to
that research agenda. The concessions that Keegan Resources and Newmont have
obtained from the Ghanaian state give these companies legal access to subterra-
nean ore deposits, but they are only partially able to beneﬁt from this. In both
cases, we see that the companies still have to work out socio-spatial divisions of
ore. Ribot and Peluso (2003) rightly stress that factors such as technology, knowl-
edge, authority and identities play a key role in access mechanisms. Our approach
to in-depth geopolitics applies their insights by connecting differences in techno-
logical capabilities and geological knowledge to the social ﬁeld of localized politics
and social organization. Companies use technology and geological knowledge to
carry out their mining operations in regions where artisanal mining has a long
history and strong associations with traditional forms of land use and ownership.
Interestingly, the way in which artisanal miners can ‘interrupt’ state–capital alli-
ances is due to their association with chiefs, who can still act as landowners.
The two cases show two different ways in which foreign mining companies appear
to depend upon local political authorities. On the Keegan Resources exploration
concession, chiefs play a major role. In the eyes of artisanal miners, the real author-
ity is not the state-backed company but the chief. In working towards governance
arrangements, Keegan Resources was very much aware of its dependence on this
local authority. At one point the chief pleaded in favour of using machines to
rework the zone dredged by Bonte. The company tried to curb this by proposing
an alliance with the chief to restrict artisanal mining to local people and local tech-
niques, thereby trying to conﬁne access to those with property rights, yet using
limited technologies. The tense situation that resulted increased the company’s
dependence on the chief to work out a form of cohabitation in which artisanal
mining could be conﬁned. In this case, foreign capital was unable to rely on the
state, and was compelled instead to give weight to a speciﬁc category of citizens –
traditional chiefs. This example underscores how neoliberal shifts in governance –
where the state must retreat and give room to private actors – tend to strengthen
rather than weaken the position of customary authorities (Geschiere 2007).
At Newmont’s concession, where artisanal miners are tolerated in the artisanal
mining site Sikamina, we similarly witnessed the central role of traditional author-
ities. Newmont’s ‘generosity’ of ‘leaving’ this area to the artisanal miners was
based on a pragmatic assessment of the social ﬁeld in which the company operates:
the company reckoned that chiefs, landowners and artisanal miners would team
up if the company tried to ‘empty’ its concession by forcing them out. These stra-
tegic arrangements with artisanal miners are not part of the formal CSR policies.
They came to the fore only when we delved into the geological details of
Newmont’s mining projects.
Teaming up with geologist Henk Gewald as co-researcher opened the doors to
technical experts with surprisingly relevant information on the politics of cohabit-
ation. Their knowledge about the underground positioning of ore (the 3D charac-
teristics) informs strategies for controlling and maintaining access in the 2D social
ﬁeld of stakeholders. We see that Newmont could use the geological knowledge to
determine strategies of ‘access maintenance’ for future gold production. Keegan
found it more problematic to safeguard its access to ore, since that access
depended on local authorities as mediators.
Our approach to in-depth geopolitics incorporates the 3D optics of companies,
which allows for a more nuanced approach to issues of access and sovereignty
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than the insights offered by Ferguson in ‘Seeing like an oil company’ (2005).We have
seen that concessions may seem to give a company a legal space to rule, but in prac-
tice this has to be exercisedwith care. Our analysis allows us to use Ferguson’s (ibid.)
distinction between ‘usable’ and ‘unusable’ space in more subtle and dynamic ways:
the strategic interplay between usable and unusable spaces within concessions is best
seen as an outcome of both struggles over access and strategies for cohabitation. In
the case of Newmont, geological knowledge about the location of the water table in
between two tables of ore bodies is used to decide how to control and maintain
access: artisanal miners are ‘given’ the upper layer of the ore body, and the
company knows – or presumes – that it will be able to mine what is underneath
the water table sometime in the future. As a result of pressures in the social ﬁeld
and company–community strategies, the company decided to consider the upper
layer of usable ore as unusable for its own extraction, ‘leaving it’ to artisanal
miners. This is an interesting example of ‘vertical reciprocity’ (Adey 2010; Bridge
2013): Newmont deems the upper layer ‘unusable’, giving up ore in the present in
order to govern and secure long-term social relations. Interestingly, we have seen
that local people take a different view. They do not view the company as ‘giving’
them permission and access, as they are entitled to take what belongs to them in
the ﬁrst place. ‘Local interruptions’ (Emel et al. 2011) are ﬁrst of all produced by dif-
ferences in perception on access, legitimate authorities and property regimes.
In contrast, Keegan Resources was not in a position to strategically distin-
guish between usable and unusable, to ‘give up’ a speciﬁc part of the ore for
the artisanal miners in order to safeguard another part for themselves. The
geological 3D situation simply did not allow for this, since the company and
the artisanal miners both wanted to work the same ore, and there was no
barrier such as a water table that could be used to realize a split arrangement
similar to Newmont’s case. Keegan’s only option to prevent artisanal miners
from encroaching upon ‘their’ ore was to work out an arrangement with
traditional chiefs.
Conclusion
We have seen that there is an extensive literature on the relationship between
large-scale and small-scale mining. Too often, these two types of miners are por-
trayed as if they act in isolation from groups with other identities, be they state
ofﬁcials, local chiefs or farmers. Notions such as ‘stakeholders’ and ‘company–
community relations’ (Ballard and Banks 2003) have inhibited proper analyses
of the empirical processes of socio-politics on the ground. Only recently – and
belatedly – have scholars such as Hilson and Geenen started to look into the
nexus between mining and local politics. The link between traditional political
authorities and mining is particularly pertinent in Ghana and resonates with the
longstanding relationship between gold mining and political structures in Akan
history. Wilks has shown how, since the ﬁfteenth and sixteenth centuries, gold
mining facilitated the accumulation of (unfree) labour in Akan societies,
which in turn triggered an increase in agricultural production. This process of
wealth creation was at the basis of the rise of Akan polities (Wilks 1977: 521).
In colonial and postcolonial Ghana, chiefs have been recognized by state
authorities as custodians of the land (Ubink 2007), but also as recipients of
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monies awarded by mineral development funds (MDFs) (Standing and Hilson
2013). This often causes chiefs to be in league with the state or mining compan-
ies, but our article shows that other alliances are possible as well. The connection
between mining and political histories allows for identiﬁcations between local
political authorities and artisanal miners, who see their work as a continuum
of what their ancestors did (Hilson 2002b). Notions of autochthony allow arti-
sanal miners, and local community members more broadly, to see the ore bodies
as ‘theirs’. Politics of belonging (Geschiere 2009) and shifting alliances between
miners and authorities of different kinds thus deserve full attention in studies on
mining.
This article contributes to such a focus by rethinking geopolitics (Cowen and
Smith 2009) and access (Ribot and Peluso 2003). This allows us to situate
mining operations in the local socio-political context in which they operate, as
well as to recognize the relationships between different miners within broader
social contexts of governance. The ‘interruptions’ we then witness provide inter-
esting nuances on the state–capital alliances facilitated by ‘subterranean sover-
eignty’; we see that local alliances between traditional authorities and miners
can make companies vulnerable and dependent upon collaborations with locals.
We also see that miners are recognized as politically valuable for their votes,
and this may force state authorities to collaborate with miners ‘against’ compan-
ies. When analysing the politics of cohabitation in mining concessions and
their surroundings, governance arrangements come to the fore based on
complex (temporary) alliances and cleavages that are informed by socio-historical
circumstances.
We have used the concept of ‘in-depth geopolitics’ to foreground how such gov-
ernance arrangements depend not only on social situations, but also on the geo-
logical and technical aspects of mining. In that respect, the article develops
further the recent analytical probing of articulations between the social and the
natural. Studies on the materiality of minerals and mining infrastructure
(Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014) show us that resource extraction depends on
socionatures, on intricate entanglements of social and natural aspects. The
notions of ‘reserve’ and ‘resource’ illustrate how the underground is variously
classiﬁed according to such schemas of entanglement. Ore bodies are identiﬁed
and their classiﬁcation incorporates assessments of social, political, geological
and technical capabilities to access ore. Knowledge of socionatures, and hence
of the complex possibilities of accessing and extracting minerals, is of crucial
importance in the governance strategies of companies.
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Abstract
Studies of articulations between large- and small-scale mining have overlooked the
subterranean dimension of extraction and ignored how mining companies and
artisanal miners cohabit in places with long histories of small-scale mining and
are affected by their different capacities to access speciﬁc mineral deposits.
Drawing on a study of two gold concessions in Ghana, this article focuses on
three factors that inﬂuence modalities of governing access to gold in such sites:
the stage of a mining operation, the local socio-political context, and the charac-
teristics of the subterranean structure. We call the combination and interplay of
these factors ‘in-depth geopolitics’. The article shows how this interplay affects
the strategies used by both large- and small-scale miners to workout arrangements
of cohabitation and ways of governing access, control and maintenance to gold in
spatial settings where both types of gold mining occur side by side. By tracing
ethnographically the variations of ‘in-depth geopolitics’, this article critically
engages with ideas of subterranean sovereignty, mining enclaves, state–
company–community relations, and the socio-spatial characteristics of mining
concessions.
Résumé
Les études sur les articulations entre les activités minières à grande et à petite
échelle ont occulté la dimension souterraine de l’extraction et ignoré la manière
dont les sociétés minières et les artisans mineurs cohabitent dans des lieux qui
ont une longue histoire d’exploitation minière à petite échelle et sont affectés
par différentes capacités à accéder aux gisements. S’appuyant sur une étude de
deux concessions aurifères au Ghana, cet article traite de trois facteurs qui inﬂuen-
cent les modalités de gouvernance d’accès à l’or sur ces sites : le stade d’exploita-
tion minière, le contexte sociopolitique local et les caractéristiques de structure
souterraine. Les auteurs appellent « géopolitique en profondeur » la combinaison
et l’interaction de ces facteurs. L’article montre comment cette interaction affecte
les stratégies utilisées par les mineurs à grande et à petite échelle pour trouver des
modes de cohabitation et de gouvernance d’accès, de contrôle et de maintenance
de l’or dans les espaces où se côtoient ces deux types d’exploitation aurifère. En
faisant un tracé ethnographique des variations de « géopolitique en profondeur »,
cet article traite demanière critique des idées de souveraineté souterraine, d’enclaves
minières, des relations État/entreprise/communauté et des caractéristiques socio-
spatiales des concessions minières.
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